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BULLARD v. BARNES-PARENTAL RECOVERY
FOR LOST SOCIETY AND COMPANIONSHIP
OF A MINOR CHILD UNDER THE
ILLINOIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
INTRODUCTION
A growing number of jurisdictions' allow parents to recover damages in
wrongful death actions for the loss of a minor child's society and compan-
ionship. 2 This deprivation of society and companionship is referred to as a
loss of consortium.3 Until recently, Illinois courts adhered to the traditional
1. See Williams v. Dowling, 318 F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1963) (interpreting law of Virgin
Islands); American R.R. v. Santiago, 9 F.2d 753 (lst Cir. 1926) (interpreting law of Puerto
Rico); Bond v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 366 (1911); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho
570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971); Smith v.
City of Detroit, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347,
113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397
(1972); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Anderson v. Lale, 88 S.D. 111, 216 N.W.2d 152 (1974); Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982); Lockhart
v. Besel, 17 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). See also infra note 80.
Twenty-five jurisdictions have amended their wrongful death statutes to include recovery
for loss of consortium. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.580 and 09.15.010 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-909 (1983) (spouse only); FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1984 Supp.); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663.3
(1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.135 (1984); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2315 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1984-85) ($50,000 limit);
MD. [CTs. & JUD. PROC.] ANN. CODE § 3-904(d) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2
(West 1984-85); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2125-02 (Page 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1055 (West 1984-85) (unmarried,
unemancipated child); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.2 (1984); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492b (1984); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 76 (1983) (loss of companionship
for death of parent or spouse; mental pain and suffering for death of child); VA. CODE § 8.01-
52 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (1985) (child); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1984);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (1984).
2. "Society" and "companionship" are the two most frequently-cited elements of a parent-
child loss of consortium action. Although consortium includes other elements such as love, aid,
guidance, felicity, care, and advice, this Note refers to "society and companionship" or
"society" when discussing a parent's cause of action for loss of a child's consortium. See Sea
Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974) (" 'society' embraces a broad range of
mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including
love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection").
3. Historically, the term "consortium" meant the loss of an injured spouse's services,
sexual relations, companionship and society. W. KEETON, D. Donas, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER & KEETON]. Today, consortium is no longer limited to injured spouses. It represents
losses suffered as a result of the injury or death of any family member. See, e.g., Hair v.
County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644 (1975); Theama v.
City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
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approach,4 which denied recovery for loss of consortium to the parent despite
the absence of such a proscription5 in the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. 6 The
Illinois statute provides that the parent' may recover "fair and just compen-
sation with reference to the pecuniary injuries'' resulting from the child's
death. Illinois courts nevertheless defined "pecuniary injuries" 9 narrowly
and limited parental recovery to the economic value of the earnings and
services that the child would have contributed had the child lived.' 0 The
courts' restrictive interpretation of "pecuniary injuries" denied parents com-
pensation for the loss of their child's society and companionship.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently reviewed its narrow pecuniary-loss
interpretation as applied to child death cases." The court, in Bullard v.
Barnes, 12 reasoned that in light of present social realities, the loss that parents
suffer when their child dies is not limited to the value of the child's expected
4. The traditional approach to consortium is reflected in cases in numerous jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1983); Jones v. Hildebrandt,
550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976); Shattuck v. Gulliver, 40 Conn. Supp. 95, 481 A.2d 1110 (1984);
Bulloch Co. Hosp. Auth. v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 183 S.E.2d 586 (1917); Boland v.
Greer, 409 N.E.2d 1116, pet. to transfer denied, 422 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1980); Siciliano v.
Capital City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19 (N.H. 1984); Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d
1104 (1983); Fornaro v. Jill Bros., Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 1031, 249 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1984);
Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 304 Pa. Super. 43, 450 A.2d 91 (1982); Struther
v. Lane, 554 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1977).
5. See Trotter v. Moore, 113 I1. App. 3d 1011, 1016, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Dist.
1983) (jury may not consider deceased child's society as a pecuniary injury under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act); Bohnen v. Wingereid, 80 Ill. App. 3d 232, 241, 398 N.E.2d 1204, 1211
(Ist Dist. 1979) ("love, friendship, and charm" of deceased 16-year-old girl may not be
considered under Wrongful Death Act); Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 70, 377 N.E.2d
261, 266 (1st Dist. 1978) (plaintiff may not recover in Illinois for the lost society of a child).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1984-85).
7. The parent is the child's lineal "next of kin" under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill. App. 2d 295, 302, 196 N.E.2d 16, 20 (1st Dist. 1964).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 provides:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal represent-
atives of such deceased person, and, except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the
amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the
surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person and in every such action
the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation
with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving
spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.
Id. (emphasis added)
9. "Pecuniary injuries" is defined as the deprivation of a reasonable expectation of a
pecuniary, i.e., monetary or financial, advantage which would have resulted if the deceased's
life had continued. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (5th ed. 1979). See also Halvorsen v.
Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1974) ("pecuniary injuries" denotes a financial or monetary
loss); Johnson, Wrongful Death and Intellectual Dishonesty, 16 S.D.L. REV. 36, 39 (1971)
(pecuniary injury or loss is extensive with the pocketbook value of the probable contributions
and support which decedent would have rendered to survivors).
10. See City of Chicago v. Major, 18 I1. 349, 357 (1857); Bohnen v. Wingereid, 80 Ill.
App. 3d 232, 241, 398 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ist Dist. 1979).
11. The term "child death" will be used in this Note to refer to the wrongful death of a
child.
12. 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984).
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economic contributions. The court concluded that the statutory phrase "pe-
cuniary injuries" is broad enough to include parental recovery for the
substantial loss of society and companionship of a deceased child.' 3 Illinois
therefore joins a majority of jurisdictions that compensate parents for the
pecuniary loss of consortium'4 suffered upon the wrongful death of a minor
child. This Note examines the evolution of the wrongful death action and
the concept of loss of consortium. The Note concludes, after a complete
analysis of the Bullard decision, that the legislature should amend the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act to expressly include lost consortium recovery for the
spouse and next of kin.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Emergence of the Wrongful Death Action
At common law, no civil action existed for the wrongful death of a human
being.' 5 This harsh rule originated in the 1808 English case of Baker v.
Bolton,' 6 in which Lord Ellenborough stated that "in a civil suit, the death
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury."' 7 Lord Ellen-
borough neither cited authority nor gave supporting rationale for his opin-
13. Id. at 517-18, 418 N.E.2d at 1234-35; see infra text accompanying notes 89-98.
14. Numerous jurisdictions have similarly defined "pecuniary injury" to include recovery
for loss of a child's society and companionship. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331,
105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962); Sanders
v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
Other jurisdictions have generally abandoned the "pecuniary injury" standard. Recovery
for the child's society and companionship, therefore, is not limited to the pecuniary value of
the loss. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d 539 (1949); Selders v. Armentrout,
190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969);
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); see also 4 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL,
C. AXELROD, & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 24.11[5], 24.20 (1984) (discussing
judicial interpretation of "pecuniary injury") [hereinafter cited as DAMAGES IN TORT].
15. See Howlett v. Doglio, 402 111. 311,319, 83 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1949) (no right of recovery
for the death of an injured person existed at common law). For a complete discussion of the
common law rule denying wrongful death actions, see S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH § 1:1 (2d ed. 1975); McElvain, The Illinois Wrongful Death Act and the Common Law,
2 S. ILL. U.L.J. 231 (1979).
16. 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); see also Baird v. Chicago B. & Q.
R.R., 11 111. App. 2d 264, 268, 296 N.E.2d 365, 367 (4th Dist. 1973) (citing Baker) (wrongful
death acts are in derogation of common law), rev'd on other grounds, 63 Ill. 2d 463, 349
N.E.2d 237 (1968).
17. 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). Not until 1848 did American courts
accept the Baker rule that denied wrongful death recovery. See Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas.
894 (D. Me. 1825) (no. 11,234); Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (Conn. 1794);
Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). In 1848, the Supreme Court of
Massachussetts expressly adopted the Baker rule in Carey v. Berkshire, 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475,
48 Am. Dec. 616 (1848). For a complete history of the Baker rule's influence in America, see
Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965).
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ion.'8 Commentators agree, however, that the Baker holding was probably
derived from the felony-merger doctrine. 9 The felony-merger doctrine pro-
vided that no civil cause of action existed when the wrongful act constituted
both tort and felony. Punishment of the felony, which in the nineteenth
century generally lead to the felon's execution, preempted the tort action.
Following the felon's death, the felon's possessions were forfeited to the
Crown. 20 The felony-merger doctrine eliminated the possibility of a third
party recovering damages for the victim's death since no assets remained in
the felon's estate once the crime was punished. The doctrine rendered the
felon's estate judgment proof.2
Although civil actions for wrongful death did not exist at common law,
civil actions for wrongful injury were permitted. 2 Damages could be awarded
18. F. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL DEATH 12 (2d ed. 1913) ("no satisfactory reason for
the rule has ever been suggested").
W.S. Holdsworth commented on the inadequacy of the Baker decision:
It has been upheld in all the reported cases, not by reasoning based upon a discussion
of the question of its policy or impolicy, not by any sufficient technical or historical
reasons, but by the assertion that it is a rule of the common law which must be
followed. If a broad legal principle, not manifestly just, is thus laid down as a rule
of the common law, we should expect that some sufficient reasons, historical or
technical, or both, would be adduced for it. But none of the cases adduce any such
reasons.
Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule of Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAW Q. REV. 431, 431 (1916).
19. The felony-merger doctrine, which denied wrongful death recovery, dates as far back
as 1607. In Higgins v. Butcher, I Brownl. & Golds. 205, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K. B.
1607), the English Court ruled that a husband who lost his wife as a result of an assault could
not sue for her death because of the felonious nature of the assault. The Higgins court stated:
If a man beats the servant (of another) so that he dies of the battery, the master
shall not have an action against the other for battery and loss of the service, because
the servant's dying of the extremity of battery, has now become an offense to the
Crown, being converted into felony and that drowns the particular offense and
private wrong offered to the master before, and his action is thereby lost.
Id.
In a similar case, the same principle was stated that "(i]f A beat the wife of B, so that she
dies, B can have no action of the case for that; because it is criminal, and of a higher nature."
Smith v. Sykes, I Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K. B. 1677). The felony-merger doctrine was
later qualified so that the private wrong was not entirely destroyed by the merger into the
felony but only suspended until criminal prosecution was completed. Holdsworth, supra note
18, at 431. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970) (Court's
discussion and explanation of the "felony-merger doctrine").
20. See Malone, supra note 17, at 1055-58. At common law wrongful death recovery was
barred because of the broad maxim of actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action
dies with the person. For a complete discussion of the maxim, see Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill.
311, 319, 83 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1949) (at common law the cause of action terminated with the
death of the injured person); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV. 605, 605-09 (1960). The prohibition of wrongful death actions may also have
stemmed from the alleged difficulty and repugnance of setting a price upon human life. Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
21. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 37 n.5.
22. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 91, 93 (1935); 22 DRAKE L. REV. 200, 200 (1972) (at
common law damages could only be awarded where the negligent act produced a non-fatal
injury).
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when a negligent act produced a non-fatal injury.23 Thus, "it was more
profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him."24 To
correct this inequity, England's Parliament in 1846 adopted a wrongful death
statute, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act.25 The Act provided a
new cause of action that permitted "the families of persons killed by
accidents" to recover for damages "proportioned to the injury resulting
from such death."2 16 The damages provision gave juries great discretion in
assessing damages in wrongful death actions. The early English courts,
however, narrowly interpreted Lord Campbell's Act to allow recovery only
for the "pecuniary" injuries or losses suffered as a result of the family
member's death.2 7 No such pecuniary loss limitation was expressed in the
statute itself.
In cases involving the wrongful death of a minor child, English courts
limited the parental recovery to the value of the services and wages the child
would have provided the household had the child lived, minus the expense
of nurturing and raising the child to adulthood. 2 This pecuniary loss rule
23. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at §§ 91, 93; Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350-
51, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961) (recovery for wrongful injury, but not death, permitted at
common law).
24. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
25. Lord Campbell's Act is the common name of the Fatal Accidents Act. Section One of
the Act provides in part:
[W]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable if death
had ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of
the person injured, and although the death shall have been under such circumstances
as amount in law to felony.
Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846). See generally PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 3, § 127, at 945 (Lord Campbell's Act enacted to provide remedy for
the victim's family, who were frequently left destitute).
Aside from the inequity at common law of allowing an action for negligent injury and not
for wrongful death, another major reason for the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act was the
Industrial Revolution and the resulting "new phenomenon" of "corporate negligence." Fatal
accidents were no longer solely intentional or "the work of the robber, the burglar or the hot-
blooded man." Rather, many fatal accidents were due to negligent acts directly related to the
railroad, the streetcar, and the factory. Many families were left destitute when the breadwinner
was killed. Lord Campbell's Act provided a remedy for this phenomenon. Malone, supra note
17, at 1070; Belfance, The Inadequacy of Pecuniary Loss as a Measure of Damages in Actions
for the Wrongful Death of Children, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 543, 547-48 (1979).
26. Lord Campbells' Act (Fatal Accidents Act) 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846). Family members
allowed to benefit under Lord Campbell's Act were the wife, husband, parent, and child. Id.
27. The leading cases interpreting Lord Campbell's Act to allow only pecuniary loss recovery
were Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ex. 1852), and Duckworth v.
Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653, 157 Eng. Rep. 997 (1859); see also S. SPEISER, supra note 15, at §
3:1.
28. Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ex. 1852); see also Wycko
v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 334, 105 N.W.2d 118, 120 (1967) (English Courts interpreted Lord
Campbell's Act to limit damage awards to probable pecuniary loss to beneficiaries).
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accurately reflected the social conditions of the nineteenth century.2 9 In Lord
Campbell's day, child labor in factories and on farms was customary, and
children were considered economic assets or "servants" of their parents.30
Because a parent, as "master," was legally entitled to the services and
earnings of the unemancipated minor,3' the British wrongful death statute
provided an appropriate remedy when the death of a child had a direct
impact on the family's income."
29. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 335, 105 N.W.2d 118, 120 (1960) (stating that
common law court rulings reflected philosophy, ideals, and social conditions of their time).
Under the common law doctrine of pater familias, the father was vested with authority to
bring an action for injuries to his family that were caused by third-party tortfeasors. Similar
to the master's recovery for the lost services of an injured servant, the husband-father had an
ownership interest in his family and therefore was entitled to the pecuniary value of his wife's
and child's earnings and services. Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F.
493, 497. For a discussion of the doctrine of pater familias, see Theama v. City of Kenosha,
117 Wis. 2d 508, 511-12, 344 N.W.2d 513, 514 (1984); Fisher, Pater Familias-A Cooperative
Enterprise, 41 ILL. L. REV. 27 (1946). The father was the logical choice to bring a cause of
action because the mother-wife was considered inferior and without legal existence to bring
actions. The mother-wife's identity was automatically merged with the husband's upon marriage.
See Love v. Moynehan, 16 111. 277, 280 (1855); see also Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 421-
22, 170 N.E.2d 881, 889 (1960) (wife, as servant, could not sue for loss of services of the
master). The common law perceived the husband and wife as one, and the husband was that
one. Betser v. Betser, 186 111. 537, 538-39, 58 N.E. 249, 249 (1900). However, if the father
deserted the family, the mother became head of the family and was entitled to sue for loss of
the child's earnings and services. Brisco v. Prince, 275 III. 63, 68, 113 N.E. 881, 883 (1916).
In 1861, the Illinois Married Woman's Act, 1861 Ill. Laws 143, removed the wife's legal
disability and gave her capacity to sue. Although the common law allowed the husband a right
of action for loss of consortium due to negligent injury to his wife, no similar right was granted
to the wife under the Married Woman's Act. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 II1. 2d 406, 428, 170 N.E.2d
881, 891 (1960).
In 1950, a wife's cause of action for lost consortium caused by negligent injury to her
husband was recognized in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950). In allowing the wife's claim for loss of her husband's "aid, assistance,
enjoyment, and sexual .intercourse," the Hitaffer court held that the lost consortium action was
based on an interference with the marital relationship and that both spouses have always had
an equal right to each other's love and companionship by virtue of the marriage relationship.
Id. at 816; see Feldman, Parent's Cause of Action in Tennessee for Injured Child's Lost
Earnings and Services, Expenses, and Lost Society: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV.
83, 86 (1983); Foster, supra note 29, at 497.
30. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 335, 105 N.W.2d 118, 120 (1960) ("It was an
era when ample work could be found for the agile bodies and nimble fingers of small children");
Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 278, 207 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1973) (children went to work
on farms and in factories at age 10 and even earlier in the nineteenth century).
31. See City of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 I11. 468,471 (1874) (father entitled to unemancipated
minor's services). For a historical discussion of a father's right to the services of his children,
see Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 652-53 (1930); Ardy v. Jeffries, I Cro. Eliz.
55 (Q.B. 1587) (basis for father's enticement action was the loss of his child's services).
32. The Michigan Supreme Court traced the pecuniary loss doctrine back to Lord Campbell's
era and stated:
This, then, was the day from which our precedents come [sic], a day when
employment of children of tender years was the accepted practice and their pecuniary
contributions to the family both [sic] substantial and provable . . . . Loss meant
only money loss, and money loss from the death of a child meant only his lost
wages. All else was imaginary.
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 336, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1960).
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Today all jurisdictions in the United States have wrongful death statutes."3
Although these statutes differ in their provisions,34 they can be classified
into two basic categories: loss-to-survivor statutes and loss-to-estate statutes.
A great majority of jurisdictions have enacted loss-to-survivor statutes,
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, which allow an action to be brought
on behalf of certain survivors or beneficiaries of the decedent." The desig-
nated survivors are considered foreseeable victims of the wrongdoer's con-
duct, and may recover damages for the losses which they suffer due to the
wrongful death. 36 A minority of jurisdictions have statutes that measure
damages by the loss to the decedent's estate.37 Both types of statutes measure
damages in terms of the pecuniary injuries suffered. Courts must interpret
the scope of pecuniary loss. 38
The Illinois wrongful death statute was enacted in 1853. 39 Modeled after
Lord Campbell's Act, the Illinois statute provided that an action may be
brought by the personal representative 40 of the deceased on behalf of the
spouse and next of kin for "pecuniary injuries" that result from the victim's
death. 4' The statute, which has remained virtually unchanged since its en-
33. See 4 DAMAGES IN TORT, supra note 14, at § 29 (compilation of American wrongful
death statutes).
34. For example, the Alabama wrongful death statute, unlike all other statutes, is penal in
nature and provides for punitive damages based on the degree of the tortfeasor's culpability.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (1984).
35. Forty-five states and territories have enacted loss-to-survivor statutes. See Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 n.21 (1974) (44 states have loss-to-survivor statutes).
Delaware also recently enacted a loss-to-survivor statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (1984).
36. See Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
197 (1971) (discussing the remedies provided by both types of wrongful death statutes).
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1307 (1984);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.356 (West 1984-85); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.135 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 556.12 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1984). But
see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.2 (1984) (permits lost consortium recovery to survivors, but not
for the benefit of decedent's estate). Only Iowa and Rhode Island specifically allow lost society
and companionship recovery. See Pagitt v. City of Keokuk, 206 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973);
D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying Rhode Island law). For further
discussion of loss to estate recovery, see 4 DAMAGES IN TORT, supra note 14 at §§ 23-1 to 23-
39.
38. See, e.g., Fields v. Riley, 1 Cal. App. 3d 308, 313, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1969) (loss
of child's comfort and society may reasonably be related to pecuniary loss); Lehrer v. Lorenzen,
124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951) (pecuniary loss includes child's ability to earn money and
assist parents); Childs v. Rayburn, 169 Ind. App. 147, 346 N.E.2d 655 (1976) (pecuniary loss
is value of expected benefits of child's services, including acts of kindness and attention);
Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357 (1963) (pecuniary
injury means reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage of which parent was deprived).
39. 1853 I11. Laws 97. Section One of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act creates the right of
a cause of action for wrongful death. Section Two prescribes in whose name the action shall
be brought, for whose benefit, and limits the damages to the pecuniary injuries resulting from
such death. Chicago, P. & St. L. R.R. v. Woolridge, 174 Ill. 330, 334, 51 N.E. 701, 702 (1898).
40. Personal representatives are executors or administrators of a decedent's estate. See City
of Chicago v. Major, 18 I11. 349, 358 (1857); see also Hall v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 30, 147
N.E.2d 352, 355 (1958) (purpose of single action brought by personal representatives is to avoid
multiple lawsuits).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1984-85).
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actment, 42 created both the right and the remedy for recovering damages
caused by a wrongful death.4 3
In child death cases, Illinois courts, as well as most other jurisdictions,
adopted the English approach that limited parental recovery solely to the
loss of the child's economic contributions. 4 Courts adopted this limitation
to prevent recovery based on conjecture or sympathy.4 5 The loss of a child's
society and companionship was excluded from the computation of damages
as an injury not "susceptible of pecuniary valuation. ' 46 The pecuniary loss
rule works well when the decedent is an adult or the breadwinner for his
beneficiaries. When the decedent is a minor child, however, the pecuniary
loss standard is difficult to apply because a child's earning capacity has not
yet been established and evidence of pecuniary worth cannot be accurately
determined.
4 7
Illinois courts recognized the inequity of the pecuniary loss limitation on
parental recovery in child death cases and gave the phrase "pecuniary
injuries" an expansive interpretation.4 As in most jurisdictions, Illinois juries
42. The language of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act has basically remained unchanged
since its passage in 1853. The only major changes have dealt with limitations on recovery. The
original Act set a maximum limit for recovery of pecuniary injuries at $5,000. In 1903, the
limit was increased to $10,000, 1903 I1. Laws 217, then $15,000 in 1947, 1947 Ill. Laws 1094,
$20,000 in 1951, 1951 Ill. Laws 393, $25,000 in 1955, 1955 11. Laws 2006, $30,000 in 1957,
1957 Ill. Laws 1939, and ultimately all limits were abolished in 1967. 1967 Il. Laws 3227. The
Act was also amended in 1955 with respect to distribution of recovery. Prior to the 1955
amendment, damages were distributed based on the laws of intestacy. After 1955, damages
were distributed based on the percentage of the dependency of each person on the decedent.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1955). For a discussion of the 1955 amendment, see Maca v. Rock
Island Moline City Lines, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 31, 35, 197 N.E.2d 463, 466 (3d Dist. 1964).
43. See Hall v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 29, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958) (Illinois Wrongful
Death Act created both the right and the remedy). Remedies in a wrongful death action are
limited to spouses and next of kin. Thus, the decedent's employer who contracted for decedent's
services, a creditor, or an insurer who sought payment for contractual obligations could not
obtain recovery in a wrongful death action. See City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Il. 349, 358
(1857); Smedley, supra note 20, at 620.
44. See Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 63 Ill. 2d 463, 472, 349 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1976);
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 I1. 349, 360 (1857); Trotter v. Moore, 113 111. App. 3d 1011,
1016-17, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Dist. 1983).
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 127, at 9.
46. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 317, 83 N.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1949); see also Kaiserman
v. Bright, 61 111. App. 3d 67, 70, 377 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1st Dist. 1978) (Illinois allows no
recovery for lost society as a pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act).
47. Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 533, 151 N.E.2d 120, 122 (4th Dist. 1958);
Comment, Damages For the Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 538, 541 (1955).
48. The first Illinois Court to interpret the statute said:
This is a new cause of action given by this statute, and unknown to the common
law, and should not be extended beyond the fair import of the language used; but
this it would be difficult to do, for the language is very broad and comprehensive,
embracing, in direct and positive terms, all cases where, if death had not ensued,
the injured party could have maintained an action for the injury.
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 I11. 349, 357 (1857). See also Elliott v. Willis, 89 Ill. App. 3d
1144, 1146, 412 N.E.2d 638, 640 (4th Dist. 1980) (case law points to a liberal, expansive
interpretation of the pecuniary loss standard); Carr, Measuring Damages in the Family Context,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 574, 575 (courts give "pecuniary injuries" a liberal interpretation where death
cuts off a close family relationship).
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are instructed to consider not only the loss of the child's economic contri-
butions during minority, but also to assess the probable earnings the child
would have contributed during the continuation of his life. 49 Yet, contrary
to the majority of jurisdictions, Illinois did not require that juries deduct
child rearing expenses from pecuniary injuries.5 Illinois courts presumably
recognized that the value of a child's wages and services will only rarely
exceed the cost of raising the child to the age of majority. Consequently,
including the cost of rearing a child would defeat the remedial purpose of
the Wrongful Death Act, which is to provide compensation for the wrongful
death of a family member. 2
To further mitigate the harshness of the pecuniary loss rule, the Illinois
courts relaxed certain proof requirements. The courts created a presumption53
49. See Lichtenstein v. L. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 191, 198-99, 111 N.E. 729, 732 (1916)
jury instructed to compute damages for deceased child's life beyond age 18); United States
Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 Ill. 531, 534-35, 71 N.E. 1081, 1083 (1904) (damages for
deceased four-year-old calculated beyond age 21); City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 I1. 222, 230,
2 N.E. 267, 270 (1885) (parent expected to derive pecuniary benefit at any age of a child's life).
A majority of jurisdictions recognize that parents may recover pecuniary benefits accruing
beyond the child's age of majority. See, e.g., J. Paul Smith Co. v. Tipton, 237 Ark. 486, 374
S.W.2d 176 (1964); St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
Thompson v. Ogemaw County Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs, 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959);
Mitchell v. Bechheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977).
50. See, e.g., Fields v. Riley, I Cal. App. 3d 308, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1969) (jury instructed
to deduct prospective cost to parent of the child's support and education); Lehrer v. Lorenzen,
124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951) (net pecuniary loss equals pecuniary benefit minus cost of
maintaining and educating child); Childs v. Rayburn, 169 Ind. App. 147, 341 N.E.2d 655 (1976)
(recovery limited to value of child's services less cost of support and maintenance).
51. In an Illinois wrongful death action, juries are asked to calculate damages based on a
reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the deceased's life. Mc-
Farlane v. Chicago City Ry., 288 Ill. 476, 482, 123 N.E. 638, 640 (1919); see supra note 49
and infra note 64. This author has found only one Illinois case where child rearing costs were
deducted from the pecuniary benefit expected. Wall v. Greene, 321 Il1. App. 161, 52 N.E.2d
303 (2d Dist. 1943). Because child rearing costs are generally not considered in Illinois wrongful
death cases, it would be objectionable for defense counsel to argue that the expense of raising
a child far exceeds the child's pecuniary value. Pavalon, Damages- Wrongful Death of Children,
50 ILL. B. REC. 84 (1968).
52. See Elliott v. Willis, 92 III. 2d 530, 540, 442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1982) (purpose of wrongful
death act is to compensate surviving spouse and next of kin for pecuniary losses sustained due
to decedent's death). In Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961), a United States
court of appeals refused a child rearing deduction in a wrongful death action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act stating:
[W]e cannot believe that Congress intended to allow any such cold-blooded deduc-
tion. Such a deduction is not actually logical for it would treat an incalculable loss
as a "pecuniary gain". What makes life worth living more than the privilege of
rearing a son? Shall that privilege be treated by law as a liability of which the
child's death relieves the parent? Is it not still the law in that most sacred of
relationships that it is more blessed to give than to receive? We are entirely without
doubt that Congress intended no deduction to be made for the cost of rearing the
child to majority.
Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
53. "Presumption" has been defined as "an inference as to the existence of one fact from
the existence of some other basic fact established by the proof." Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d
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of pecuniary loss when the surviving family member was a spouse or lineal
kin.14 Because a parent was considered the deceased child's lineal next of
kin," and would have been legally entitled to the child's services until the
age of majority,56 the presumption was applied in child death cases. 7 As a
result, parents did not have to prove that they suffered actual loss,5 8 even if
the child had never been gainfully employed and had not contributed services
to the household.5 9 The law presumed that upon the child's death, the parent
and lineal next of kin suffered substantial pecuniary injury.611
The presumption of pecuniary loss, however, did not apply to collateral
kindred of the decedent, such as a brother or sister.6' Unlike lineal next of
kin, collateral kin are not in the decedent's direct line of descent. 62 Even
with the presumption, collateral kin could only recover actual damages.
6
1
Although a parent was not required to prove pecuniary loss, the jury
could consider the age, health, and sex of both the child and parent,
and the closeness of the parent/child relationship, in assessing the amount
of damages. 64 Thus, in Baird v. Chicago Baltimore & Quincy Railroad
236, 239, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1968); see also McElroy v. Force, 38 III. 2d 528, 531, 232
N.E.2d 708, 710 (1967) (presumption is an inference which common sense draws from the
known course of events).
54. See, e.g., Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 63 Ill. 2d 463, 472, 349 N.E.2d 413, 417
(1976); Flynn v. Vancil, 41 fi. 2d 236, 238-39, 242 N.E.2d 237, 238-40 (1968); Knierim v. Izzo,
22 111. 2d 73, 82, 174 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1961); Chicago P. & St. L. R.R. v. Woolridge, 174 Il.
330, 334, 51 N.E. 701, 702 (1898); City of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Il. 468, 471 (1874).
55. See Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill. App. 2d 295, 301, 196 N.E.2d 16, 20 (1st Dist. 1964).
56. See Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 68 (1917) (applying Minnesota
law); City of Chicago v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 204, 207 (1876) (holding that presumption of pecuniary
loss arises from parent's legal right to minor child's services).
57. See cases cited supra note 54.
58. See Stafford v. Rubens, 115 Ill. 196, 198, 3 N.E. 568, 569 (1885); Chicago v. Hesing,
83 Ill. 204, 207 (1876); City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 360 (1857).
59. See Dodson v. Richter, 34 I1. App. 2d 22, 25, 180 N.E.2d 505, 507 (3d Dist. 1962)
(stating that whether plaintiffs were in the habit of claiming and receiving pecuniary assistance
from the deceased is immaterial).
60. See cases cited supra note 54.
61. For a discussion of the distinction between collateral and lineal kin, see Holton v. Daly,
106 Ill. 131 (1882); Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 I11. App. 2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16 (Ist Dist. 1964);
Dodson v. Richter, 34 Il. App. 2d 22, 180 N.E.2d 505 (3d Dist. 1962).
62. Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill. App. 2d 295, 301, 196 N.E.2d 16, 19-20 (1964); see also
Chicago P. & St. L. R.R. v. Woolridge, 174 Il. 330, 334, 51 N.E. 701, 702 (1898) (court held
that collateral kindred must establish that "they were in the habit of claiming and receiving
pecuniary assistance from the decedent").
63. Chicago P. & St. L. R.R. v. Woolridge, 174 11. 330, 334, 51 N.E. 701, 701 (1898).
64. Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 238-39, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1968) (no award of
damages affirmed when evidence showed deceased infant had congenital disease); City of
Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468, 471 (1874) (upheld $2,833.33 verdict based on evidence of
deceased's age, names of next of kin, and that his parents were laboring people); Bohnen v.
Wingereid, 80 Ill. App. 3d 232, 241, 398 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (lst Dist. 1979) (upheld $15,000
verdict for deceased 16-year-old who worked part-time, sewed the family's clothes, and con-
tributed generously to her family); Maca v. Rock Island Moline City Lines, Inc., 47 Il. App.
2d 31, 37, 197 N.E.2d 463, 466-67 (3d Dist. 1964) (upheld $30,000 judgment on evidence that
deceased child was healthy, average, obedient, cooperative, and well-behaved); Ferraro v.
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Co.,65 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld an award of $188,000 to each of
the parents for the death of two high school students where the evidence
established that the decedents were "healthy, well-adjusted, intelligent young
people who attended church regularly and who enjoyed excellent relationships
with their parents." ' 66 When no direct proof of loss was established in child
death cases, the burden shifted to the defendant to establish contrary facts
which the jury would be obliged to weigh. 67 Since the presumption was
rebuttable, 68 the absence of any evidence of pecuniary loss suffered by the
plaintiff would likely militate against any substantial recovery. For example,
in Flynn v. Vancil,69 the Illinois Supreme Court denied recovery when the
defendant rebutted the presumption of loss by evidence showing that the
deceased minor was afflicted with an incurable congenital condition. 70 In
general, recovery was left to the jury's discretion and was based on the
evidence presented and the jury's common sense and experience.7' Proceeds
of recovery must then be apportioned to the next of kin in accordance with
the pecuniary loss each person suffered.7 2
The pecuniary loss rule in child death cases has come under much scrutiny
and criticism from modern courts.73 Many states, including Illinois, have
found the rule to be an archaic and inadequate measurement of the parents'
loss." These states view the pecuniary loss rule from the standpoint of
Augustine, 45 III. App. 2d 295, 302, 196 N.E.2d 16, 20 (1st Dist. 1964) ($17,000 verdict upheld
for deceased who performed work around the house and contributed income).
65. 63 Ill. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
66. Id. at 466, 349 N.E.2d at 414.
67. See Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 238-39, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1968) (defendant
rebutted presumption of pecuniary loss by showing that deceased infant had a congenital
disease); see also Baird v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 63 111. 2d 463, 472, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976)
(plaintiffs usually buttress presumption with evidence relating to good health, industrious habits,
and potential longevity of deceased minor); Carr, supra note 48, at 579 (stating that because
presumption seems to be more shadow than substance, it should be ignored by plaintiff's
attorney who has any proof of pecuniary loss).
68. Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 239, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1968) ("conclusive presump-
tions cannot be contravened by opposing evidence; whereas rebuttable presumptions may be
disputed and eliminated if they do not correspond with the circumstances actually proved").
69. 41 111. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968).
70. Id. at 240, 242 N.E.2d at 240.
71. City of Chicago v. Hesing, 83 IlI. 204, 207 (1876) (jury can estimate pecuniary injuries
from facts and their own knowledge and experience).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1984).
73. Justice Smith's statement in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960),
clearly demonstrates the courts' reluctance to uphold the pecuniary loss rule:
That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to the parent from the death of
his child should control our decisions today is a reproach to justice. We are still
turning, actually, for guidance in decision, to 'one of the darkest chapter's in the
history of childhood' . . . . In most [other] areas the development of the law has
paralleled the enlightened conscience of our people.
Id. at 337, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
74. See Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (2d Dist. 1983); Bohnen
v. Wingereid, 80 Il. App. 3d 232, 398 N.E.2d 1204 (1st Dist. 1979); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361
Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
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current economic and social conditions, under which child labor laws and
compulsory education laws have vastly reduced the number of employed
children. In contemporary society, a child is seldom considered to be an
economic asset to the family; more likely, the child is deemed a "blessed"
financial liability.75 Moreover, most jurisdictions realize that it is illogical to
allow lost consortium recovery for other family members, such as a spouse
and child, and yet deny such recovery to the parent for the death of a child.76
For example, in Green v. Bittner," the New Jersey Supreme Court was
influenced in its decision to recognize similar recovery for parents by the
fact that a child could recover for loss of guidance and counsel when the
parent died.78
In response to the inadequacy of the nineteenth century pecuniary loss
rule, twenty-five jurisdictions amended their wrongful death statutes within
the last twenty years to provide recovery for loss of consortium.7 9 An
additional fourteen jurisdictions have expressly adopted lost consortium
recovery through judicial decisions."' The modern trend, therefore, is un-
mistakably in favor of compensating parents for the lost society and com-
panionship of a deceased child.8 '
75. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 341, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1960) (today a child is
a "blessed expense"); Foster, supra note 29, at 501 (social interest in the integrity and stability
of the family, instead of a pseudoproperty interest in the child, should be the basis for wrongful
death actions).
76. Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 277, 207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1973); Green v.
Bittner, 85 N.J. I, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
77. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
78. Id. at 5, 424 A.2d at 213.
79. See supra note I.
80. See McKee v. Thompson, 558 F. Supp. 68 (D.N.D 1983); Kopera v. Moschella, 400 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 526 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Hunter, 343 F.
Supp. 1284 (D.S.C. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1973); City of Tucson v. Wondergem,
105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Fields v. Riley, I Cal. App. 3d 308, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1969); Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d 539 (1949); Wardlow v. City of Keokuk,
190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961);
Swanson v. Champion Int'l Corp., 646 P.2d 1166 (Mont. 1981); Selders v. Armentrout, 190
Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Anderson
v. Lale, 216 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1974); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Jones
v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982).
Forty states, including Illinois, now allow lost consortium recovery for the death of a child
by statute or by judicial decisions. Eleven states expressly deny such recovery to the parent.
See supra note 4. Alabama is not included among these states because it has a punitive statute.
ALA. REV. STAT. § 6-5-391 (1984). Puerto Rico recently repealed its wrongful death statute.
81. For a discussion of the development of the social and economic conditions which have
made the presumption of loss of a child's services largely fictional, see Wycko v. Gnodke, 361
Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). In response to the rigid common law rules that limited
recovery for wrongful death to the loss of pecuniary benefits, Dean Prosser said:
Recent years, however, have brought considerable modification of the rigid common
law rules. It has been recognized that even pecuniary loss may extend beyond mere
contributions of food, shelter, money or property; and there is now a decided
tendency to find that the society, care, and attention of the deceased are 'services'
to the survivor with a financial value, which may be compensated. This has been
true, for example, not only where a child has been deprived of a parent, . . . but
also where the parent has lost a child.
W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 127, at 908.
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B. "Pecuniary Injuries" in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court first interpreted the "pecuniary injuries"
phrase of the Wrongful Death Act in the 1857 decision of City of Chicago
v. Major.2 In Major, the supreme court allowed the father of a deceased
four-year-old child to recover $800 in damages even though there was no
proof of the pecuniary value of the child's life, other than evidence showing
that the child was healthy. Although the father did not present proof of
pecuniary loss, the court stated that it was within the jury's discretion to
exercise its own judgment in reaching a verdict.83 Moreover, the court held
that the jury was properly instructed to consider only the pecuniary loss the
father suffered from the child's death and not the parent's "mental anguish
or bereaved affections. 8 4 The Major decision represented the first recog-
nition of the presumption of pecuniary loss in Illinois. The decision was also
the first to interpret "pecuniary injuries" as including only the loss of a
child's services and earnings. Recovery for emotional losses, which later
would include loss of a child's society and companionship, or consortium,
was excluded.
At common law, consortium referred only to the "company and
assistance"8 5 of a wife; recovery for loss of consortium was therefore limited
solely to the husband.86 By 1960, Illinois allowed recovery for loss of
consortium to a wife. Recovery came not from the Wrongful Death Act,
but from the negligent injury to her husband. In Dini v. Naiditch,17 the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there was no basis in modern society
for the denial of the wife's common law action for loss of consortium. The
husband and wife were "equal in the eyes of the law." 88 The Dini court
defined consortium broadly to include "elements of companionship, felicity
and sexual intercourse, all welded into a conceptualistic unity."8 9 The court
extended the lost consortium action to the wife to protect the family as the
"unit upon which our society is founded." 90
Illinois courts recognized earlier that consortium was present in parent-
child relationships as well as the husband-wife relationship. 9' In Allendorf
v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway,9z a 1956 decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a $20,000 award to the decedent's four children. The Allendorf
82. 18 I11. 349 (1857).
83. Id. at 360.
84. Id.
85. See Guy v. Livesey, 3 Cro. Jac. 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. 1619) (awarding damages
for loss of an injured wife's "company"); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140 (1848).
86. See Carr, supra note 48, at 596-98; Comment, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion
of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1961); see also supra note 29.
87. 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
88. Id. at 429, 170 N.E.2d at 891.
89. Id. at 427, 170 N.E.2d at 891.
90. Id. at 430, 170 N.E.2d at 892.
91. See Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906); Anthony lttner Brick Co. v.
Ashby, 198 III. 562, 64 N.E. 1109 (1902).
92. 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1956).
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court recognized that the loss of a deceased father's "felicity, care, attention,
and guidance" were compensable as pecuniary injuries under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act.93 Two years later, in Hall v. Gillins,94 the court again
recognized that loss of a father's "support, . . . companionship, guidance,
advice, love and affection" was recoverable in a wrongful death action. 95 In
Hall, a widow and her minor child brought a common law action for
"destruction of the family unit ' 96 by the wrongful death of her husband.
The plaintiffs alleged deprivation of the husband's companionship, guidance,
advice, love, and affection. 97 The Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize
such a common law action because an adequate remedy already existed under
the Wrongful Death Act,98 unanimously holding that the term "pecuniary
injuries" was broad enough to include most of the items of damage that
the plaintiffs had claimed in the case.
In Elliott v. Willis,99 a 1982 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court extended
wrongful death coverage to families by allowing a spouse to recover for the
loss of consortium under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. In Elliott, a wife
whose husband was killed in a car accident sought recovery for loss of his
society, companionship, and conjugal relationship.""' The Illinois Supreme
Court held that loss of consortium is a compensable pecuniary injury under
the broad wording of the Wrongful Death Act."" The Elliott court relied on
both the Dini v. Naiditch and Hall v. Gillins decisions. The Elliott court
reasoned that if damages were recoverable for loss of consortium when a
spouse is injured," 2 and if the Wrongful Death Act has been broadly
interpreted to include recovery for loss of consortium,"'3 then damages for
loss of consortium should also be recoverable when injury to a spouse proves
fatal.'
While Illinois law evolved to allow a spouse or a child to recover for loss
of consortium under the Wrongful Death Act, Illinois lagged in providing
a parental cause of action for the loss of consortium of a child. Illinois
courts at an early date allowed a father to recover for loss of society and
comfort from a man who seduced his daughter.' 5 These courts observed
93. Id. at 176, 133 N.E.2d at 295.
94. 13 11. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
95. Id. at 31, 147 N.E.2d at 355.
96. Id. at 27, 147 N.E.2d at 353.
97. Id..
98. Id. at 30-31, 147 N.E.2d at 354-55.
99. 92 Il1. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
100. Id. at 533, 442 N.E.2d at 164.
101. Id. at 545, 442 N.E.2d at 170.
102. Dini, supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
103. Hall, supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
104. 92 Il1. 2d at 535, 442 N.E.2d at 167.
105. See Ball v. Bruce, 21 Ill. 161 (1859) (guardian in loco parentis allowed to recover lost
society in seduction action); Anderson v. Ryan, 8 III. 583 (1846) (value of society and attentions
of a virtuous and innocent daughter may be properly considered); Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill.
372 (1842) (parent allowed to recover loss of daughter's society and comfort caused by seduction
of daughter).
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that the real basis for recovery was not the loss of the child's services; rather,
intangible elements such as degradation to the family reputation, emotional
distress, and mental anguish formed the real basis of the father's recovery."
Despite the seduction cases and the wrongful death cases that allowed
consortium recovery for spouses and children, compensation for the loss of
consortium of a deceased child was rejected until recently. The primary
reasons for denying parental loss of consortium recovery were: the absence
of precedent," 7 the intangible nature of such losses, and the belief that lost
consortium recovery was limited to spouses.108 Since Illinois courts awarded
damages for the lost consortium of a spouse and parent, the lost consortium
of a child should also be compensable. This logic was finally adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Bullard v. Barnes.09
THE Bullard DECISION:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 1, 1979, seventeen-year-old Scott Bullard was killed in a traffic
accident.'' 0 Scott's parents filed a lawsuit"' which included counts based on
106. See Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 I11. 9, 13 (1866) (injury to character of family, distress, and
mental anguish, and not loss of services, are gravamen of a seduction action); Ball v. Bruce,
21 I11. 161 (1859) (parents' wounded feelings, family disgrace and lost society); Anderson v.
Ryan, 8 Ill. 583, 587 (1846) (recovery for loss of society and loss suffered by parents from
daughter's defilement and corrupted mind).
107. See Bohnen v. Wingereid, 80 Ill. App. 3d 232, 241, 398 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ist Dist.
1979) ("perhaps this law is heartless and perhaps it should be changed .. . [blut, that would
be a matter for the legislature").
108. See Bullard v. Barnes, 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485 (4th Dist. 1983). One
Illinois appellate court, however, reluctantly stated:
[Ilf felicity and companionship, i.e., loss of society as between a decedent and his
child or a decedent and his spouse are capable of evaluation the damages would
be no less capable of evaluation where the decedent was a child and the survivors
were the next of kin.
Trotter v. Moore, 113 I11. App. 3d 1011, 1014-15, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (2d Dist. 1983)
(citations omitted).
109. 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984).
110. Id. at 509, 468 N.E.2d at 1230. Mrs. Bullard and Scott's brother, Todd, arrived at the
scene shortly after the accident. Mrs. Bullard spoke to Scott, but he did not respond; she saw
Scott rubbing his shoulder. Todd saw Scott's swollen neck and blood dripping from his mouth.
Scott died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Scott's parents and brother sought recovery
for mental anguish. Id. The Illinois appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the mental anguish claim because none of the plaintiffs had personally witnessed the collision.
Bullard v. Barnes, 112 I11. App. 3d 384, 394, 445 N.E.2d 485, 493 (4th Dist. 1983) (citing
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 I11. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981), aff'd and
remanded, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983)). The Illinois Supreme Court did not address
the issue of mental anguish in Bullard.
111. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 508, 468 N.E.2d at 1230. Robert G. Bullard, Scott's father, filed
a cause of action individually and as administrator of Scott's estate. Sharon Bullard, Scott's
mother, and Scott's brothers also filed actions individually.
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both the Wrongful Death Act' 2 and the Survival Act."' The trial court
instructed the jury that in determining pecuniary loss to the parents under
the wrongful death count, the jury may consider the "money, goods, and
services the decedent might have reasonably been expected to contribute,"
as well as "the parents' loss of society with the decedent."'' 4 The jury
returned a general verdict in the wrongful death count of $285,000 and a
general verdict in the survival action for the decedent's pain and suffering
of $40,000.' "
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed the wrongful
death verdict," 6 holding that the jurors had been improperly instructed to
consider the parents' loss of their son's society as an element of damages
under the Wrongful Death Act." 7 The court observed that, although the
Illinois courts permit recovery for loss of a spouse's society, such recovery
had not been extended to the loss of a child's society." 8 The court assumed
a "qualitative difference" between the society of a spouse and that of a
child; it also presumed that "society is inherent [in] the marital relation-
ship."''
9
The Illinois appellate court also observed that the Wrongful Death Act
was an extension of the common law and therefore only allows recovery for
112. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1984-85).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 27-6 (1984-85). The plaintiffs sought damages for
decedent's conscious pain and suffering from the time of the collision until his death. In
addition, two counts were included for property'damage to the automobile Scott Bullard was
driving at the time of the accident. The defendant admitted liability for the property damage
in the sum of $750. The jury awarded $500 in punitive damages for the property loss. 102 Ill.
2d at 511, 468 N.E.2d at 1228.
114. Bullard v. Barnes, 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389, 445 N.E.2d 485, 489 (4th Dist. 1983). The
trial court gave the following modification of I.P.1. Civil Instruction No. 31.03 to the jurors:
In determining pecuniary loss to the parents and the weight to be given for the
presumption of pecuniary value, including money, goods, and services the decedent
might have reasonably been expected to contribute to his parents and brothers had
the decedent lived, bearing in mind what you find the evidence shows concerning
the decedent's age, sex, health, physical and mental characteristics, habits and the
parents' loss of society with the decedent.
Id. (emphasis added.)
115. Bullard, 102 I1. 2d at 571, 463 N.E.2d at 1228.
116. 112 Il. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485 (4th Dist. 1983).
117. Id. at 389-90, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
118. Id. at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
119. Id. Apparently the appellate court equated "society" with sexual relations. The term
"society," however, connotes love, affection, companionship, and felicity, which clearly are
inherent in the parent-child relationship as well as in the husband-wife relationship. A subsequent
Second District Illinois Appellate Court opinion refuted the appellate court's rationale in Bullard
and concluded:
We find no logical qualitative difference between the elements of relationships that
exist between children and their next of kin and decedent's spouses and their
surviving spouse and next of kin. The loss of society, companionship, and felicity
are no less measurable in the one context than in the other.
Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1015-16, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Dist. 1983); see
also Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644 (1975)
(no reasonable distinction exists between lost society of an injured child and lost consortium
of an injured spouse).
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actions recognized at common law in non-fatal injury cases.120 The court
recognized that the common law did not allow parents recovery for the loss
of a child's society and companionship if the child's injury was not fatal,'
and that no cause of action existed at common law for wrongful death.' 2
The appellate court concluded that the Wrongful Death Act was not intended
to provide parental recovery for lost society and companionship of a minor
child.' 23 The court reasoned that if "the Wrongful Death Act is to supply
the gap for fatal injuries and is the obverse of common law non fatal actions,
there is no basis for including within its damage provision the loss of society
of a child."' 24 The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages, in which the loss of society instructions were to be excluded.' 25
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision con-
cerning the need for retrial on damages, but based its decision on different
120. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
121. Id.; see Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 111. App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (Ist Dist.
1982); see also supra notes 22-23 (discussing the common law remedy for non-fatal injuries).
122. See Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); supra notes 15-21 and
accompanying text.
123. 112 Il. App. 3d at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
124. Id. The Illinois appellate court in Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d
1340 (2d Dist. 1983), adopted the Bullard court's rationale. The Trotter court noted that there
was no recovery at common law for loss of a child's society for a non-fatal injury and, thus,
no "shortcoming" or "gap" existed for the Wrongful Death Act to obviate where the loss of
society arises from the wrongful death of a child. Id. at 1016, 447 N.E.2d at 1343.
It appears that the appellate courts in Bullard and Trotter refused to extend lost consortium
recovery to the parent based on a narrow reading of the Illinois Supreme Court decision of
Elliot v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982). The Elliott court allowed lost consortium
recovery to a surviving spouse under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based on a broad
interpretation of the statutory phrase "pecuniary injuries." Id. at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168. The
Trotter and Bullard courts narrowly interpreted Elliott as limiting consortium recovery to
spouses only. The Elliott court, however, recognized that the modern trend was to expand, not
restrict, consortium recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. Id. at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 167.
Further, the Elliott court recognized that loss of advice, training, and guidance, see Goddard
v. Enzler, 222 i11. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906), and other intangible elements such as felicity and
care, see Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 8 111. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352
U.S. 937 (1956), were previously held compensable as "pecuniary injuries" under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act in actions brought by a child for the wrongful death of a parent. The
Elliott court, therefore, felt compelled to similarly extend the intangible lost consortium recovery
to a spouse. 92 Ill. 2d at 538, 442 N.E.2d at 167. The Elliott court's expansive interpretation
of "pecuniary injuries" and recognition of the recent trend to allow lost consortium recovery
should have persuaded, not dissuaded, the Bullard and Trotter courts to logically extend recovery
to cases involving the wrongful death of a child.
125. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 445 N.E.2d at 494. The appellate court's reversal was also
based on admission of the following evidence, which it deemed irrelevant: testimony concerning
defendant Barnes' passing maneuver and his failure to stop after the collision, and two
"prejudicial" morgue photographs of the decedent. Id. at 393-95, 445 N.E.2d at 493-95. On
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court's denial of admission of
testimony regarding the passing maneuver and Barnes' failure to stop was correct. The court,
however, disagreed with the appellate court's decision that the morgue photographs were
inadmissible, stating that there was no evidence that the trial judge had abused his discretion
in admitting the photographs into evidence. Thus, on retrial the photographs were held
admissible "assuming adequate foundation is laid." Id. at 519-20, 468 N.E.2d 1235.
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reasoning. The court held that the loss of society of a minor child is a
compensable pecuniary injury under the broad wording of the Illinois Wrong-
ful Death Act;'2 6 the jurors had been properly instructed to consider the loss
of society of the Bullards' son.' 27 The court, however, ordered that the
verdict be reviewed and the case remanded on the ground that the jurors
had not been instructed to deduct anticipated child rearing expenses from
the value of the child's lost income and society.
28
THE COURT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The Bullard court held that a parent could recover damages under the
Wrongful Death Act for the loss of society and companionship of a minor
child. The Bullard court based its decision on three considerations. First,
the court adopted the "modern trend" in jurisdictions with wrongful death
statutes similar to Illinois, which extended recovery for lost society to the
child-death cases. 29 Second, the court broadened the definition of the sta-
tutory phrase "pecuniary injuries" to include loss of society to the parent,
in accordance with similar Illinois decisions allowing such recovery to a
spouse or child. 30 Finally, the court reassessed and overturned the presump-
tion that the parent suffers only a loss of earnings and services from the
death of the child.' 3'
The Bullard court first looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.'32 The
court noted that among the twenty-three jurisdictions with statutes or deci-
sional law limiting recoveries to pecuniary loss or injuries,'33 fourteen cur-
rently allow parental recovery for a child's lost society and companionship. 3 4
The court also reviewed Illinois decisions and concluded that Illinois reflected
a similar trend to expand the scope of pecuniary injuries to include "non-
monetary losses" such as society and companionship.' 35 This conclusion was
126. 102 111. 2d at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
127. Id. at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
128. Id. at 518-19, 468 N.E.2d at 1235.
129. Id. at 512-14, 468 N.E.2d at 1232.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 515-17, 468 N.E.2d at 1233-35.
132. For other decisions noting the recent trend among the states in favor of permitting lost
society recovery, see Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 (1974); Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
133. Id. The following states have statutes specifying that damages are to be awarded for
pecuniary injury or loss: ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3724 (1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 70, § 2 (1984-85); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
573.01 (West 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. 30-810 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West 1984-85); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
11-2-3 (1984); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1984-85); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2125.02 (Page 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.2
(1984); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21-5-7 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492b (1984); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (1983); WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102 (1984)
134. 102 Ill. 2d at 512, 468 N.E.2d at 1232.
135. Id. at 514, 468 N.E.2d at 1232.
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based primarily on its prior holdings in Elliott v. Willis 3 6 and Hall v.
Gillins. 117
In Elliott, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held that a surviving
spouse may recover for the loss of her decedent husband's society under the
Wrongful Death Act. 3 ' The Bullard court observed that the Elliott decision
was "based on a broad interpretation of pecuniary injury."' 39 The Bullard
court also noted that in Hall, the supreme court similarly recognized that
the statutory phrase "pecuniary injuries" was broad enough to include
recovery to a wife and child for the loss of "companionship, guidance,
advice, love, and affection of the deceased." '1 40 In light of the Elliott and
Hall decisions, the Bullard court reasoned that since the court had previously
endorsed recovery for lost society to a spouse and child, 4' and had recognized
the broad scope of the phrase "pecuniary injuries,"'' 42 it would be anomalous
to deny parents recovery for loss of society.'43 The court concluded that in
cases involving the death of a minor child, the parents may recover for lost
society and companionship under the Wrongful Death Act. 44
The Bullard court next addressed the presumption in Illinois that the
parent suffers only the pecuniary loss of the child's earnings and services
from the child's death. 45 The court observed that the pecuniary loss limitation
arose from common law courts' interpretation of Lord Campbell's Act 46 in
136. 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
137. 13 Il1. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
138. 92 I11, 2d at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168; see supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
139. 102 III. 2d at 514, 468 N.E.2d at 1232.
140. Id. (quoting Hall 13 111. 2d at 31, 147 N.E.2d at 354-55). See also supra notes 94-98
and accompanying text (discussion of Halt).
141. 102 Ill. 2d at 514-15, 468 N.E.2d at 1232-33; see also Davis v. Hazen, 582 F. Supp.
938 (C.D. Ill. 1983) (Illinois recognizes cause of action on behalf of child for loss of parent's
society due to wrongful death); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 III. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (pre-
sumption of pecuniary loss obtains from relationship alone in wrongful death action brought
by widow for death of husband); Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) (pecuniary
injuries include loss of companionship, advice, love and affection for deceased husband-father);
Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 285, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 937
(1956) (jury may value children's loss of care and guidance of deceased father); Goddard v.
Enzler, 222 II1. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906) (damages to children for death of father may include
loss of instruction and moral training).
142. Id. at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233; see cases cited supra note 141.
143. 102 I11. 2d at 515, 418 N.E.2d at 1233.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 515-16, 468 N.E.2d at 1233; see also Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., Co., 63
Ill. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1976) (Wrongful Death Act permits damages for pecuniary
loss); Stafford v. Rubens, 115 Ill. 196, 198, 3 N.E. 568, 569 (1885) (loss of child's services is
pecuniary loss sustained by father); City of Chicago v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 204, 206-07 (1876) (only
pecuniary damages available to next of kin when death caused by negligence); City of Chicago
v. Scholten, 75 II1. 468, 471 (1874) (without pecuniary loss, only nominal damages recoverable);
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 360 (1857) (Wrongful Death Act provides recovery for
father's pecuniary loss, without consideration of mental anguish); Dodson v. Richter, 34 Ill.
App. 2d 22, 24-25, 180 N.E.2d 505, 507 (3d Dist. 1962) (damages under Wrongful Death Act
are to compensate for pecuniary injuries).
146. 102 Ill. 2d at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
light of the social conditions of the nineteenth century. 47 The court further
noted that since the Illinois Wrongful Death Act was modeled after Lord
Campbell's Act, the measure of damages has been similarly restricted to
pecuniary loss. 4 ' The court, however, recognized that the pecuniary loss rule
was "traceable to an era far removed in time and values of the 1980's,' 49
and concluded that the rule was an anachronism in modern society. The
Bullard court observed that the common law rule that limited parental
recovery to the actual or pecuniary loss of the child's income was formulated
in an era "when children were valued largely for their capacity to contribute
to the family income."' 5" Today, the court noted, children do not account
for as great a percentage of the family income as they did in the previous
century.'' Child labor laws, compulsory education, and college draw children
away from employment. Because children today rarely contribute to family
income,' the court reasoned that the common law pecuniary loss rule
enunciated in Lord Campbell's day should not apply to the relationship
between parent and child in the twentieth century. Consequently, the court
held that parents would be entitled to a presumption of pecuniary injury
from the loss of a child's society and companionship, and that such losses
would be recoverable under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.' -3 Any claimed
loss of a child's income will no longer be presumed but must actually be
proven.
The Bullard court also set forth a formula by which juries were to assess
damages.'54 The court stated that trial judges should instruct juries to deduct
the anticipated expenses of child rearing from any award for loss of society
and proven loss of income.'55 The court based its decision to include a set-
off for child rearing on persuasive authority in other jurisdictions -16 and its
recognition that upon a child's birth, the parent automatically is burdened
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 516, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 516, 468 N.E.2d at 1233 (citing Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352-53, 113
N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234. Although the Bullard court repudiated the loss of
earnings presumption, the court did state that when "the child earned income that was used
to support the family, these facts may, of course, be proved and a recovery had." Id. The
court also held that the presumption of loss of a child's society is not conclusive, but may be
rebutted by the defendant through evidence that the parent and child were estranged. Id.
154. Id. at 518-19, 468 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
155. Id. at 518-19, 468 N.E.2d at 1235.
156. Id. The Bullard court cited Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d I, 9, 187 P.2d 752, 757
(1947); Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 17 (Iowa 1977); Sellnow v. Fahey, 305
Minn. 375, 382-83, 233 N.E.2d 563, 568 (1975); Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah
1982); Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. 2d 201, 205-10, 432 P.2d 541, 544-47 (1967).
The Sellnow, Haumersen, Jones, and Clark decisions do not support the proposition of
deducting child rearing costs from the loss of society award, but instead recognize the deduction
of child rearing expenses from loss of services and earnings award.
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by additional financial responsibilities.'57 The court concluded that jurors
should be instructed to deduct from the lost society award those "expendi-
tures the parent would have been likely to incur had the child lived.' '5 s
Justice Clark concurred in the majority opinion and generally approved
the decision. Justice Clark, however, disagreed with the majority's formula
for calculating damages.' 59 Justice Clark stated that a "set-off" for child
rearing expenses, such as college tuition and living expenses, would result in
an inequitable measurement of damages by substantially reducing the amount
of damages received. 60 He also suggested that the Bullard opinion should
not be limited to wrongful death cases involving minor children, 6 but should
be extended to allow loss of society recovery for the death of a child who
has reached the age of majority. 62 Justice Clark concluded that the pre-
sumption of a parent's pecuniary loss of advice, companionship, and assist-
ance is "legally valid for [both] adult and minor child[ren].'1 63
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The Bullard court properly defined "pecuniary injuries" under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act to include loss of society and companionship of a
deceased minor child. The court recognized that the loss suffered when a
child dies can no longer be calculated merely on the basis of the child's
economic contributions. The majority included loss of society in the calcu-
lation of damages to better reflect the value of the child and the substantial
loss that parents suffer upon the child's death. Under Illinois law existing
prior to Bullard, a spouse and a child could recover for loss of society as a
pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act;'64 courts have long noted
that the Act deserves liberal interpretation.' 65 The court's extension of the
157. Bullard, 102 I11. 2d at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 I1.
2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), which acknowledged the substantial expenses associated with
child rearing). The court observed that although cases that allow lost society recovery to spouses
and children provided persuasive precedent for extending such recovery to parents, "neither
children nor spouses bear the same heavy financial responsibility for either their parent or
spouse that a parent automatically assumes upon the birth of a child." Thus, loss of child
rearing expenses was included in the court's formula for computing pecuniary injury to the
parent. Id. at 517-18, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
158. Id. at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
159. Id. at 520-21, 468 N.E.2d at 1236 (Clark, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 521, 468 N.E.2d at 1236 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark specifically cited
college tuition and living expenses as deductions which would substantially reduce the award.
Id.
161. The majority opinion expressly confined its analysis to the facts in the case, stating
"this case does not present, and we therefore need not decide, the question of whether the
loss-of-society presumption applies to children who have reached the age of majority." Id. at
517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
162. Id. at 521, 468 N.E.2d at 1236 (Clark, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Clark, J., concurring).
164. See Elliott v. Willis, 92 I11. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982) (recovery to a spouse); Hall
v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) (spouse and child); Knierim v. Izzo, 2 111. 2d
74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1961) (spouse).
165. See City of Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349 (1857); see also supra note 48.
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measurement of damages under the Act to include recovery for a parent's
loss of a child's society was the next logical step.
While the Bullard decision is commendable for allowing recovery for loss
of society when a minor child dies, the decision is ambiguous. By choosing
to limit its holding to the facts before it, the Bullard court both expressly
and implicitly refused to address the following closely connected issues: 1)
Whether the jury may extend its calculation of damages for loss of society
beyond the period of the child's minority; 2) Whether recovery for loss of
society is limited to the parent, or may collateral kin recover for the loss of
a child's society; 3) Whether parents can recover for loss of society when a
child is negligently injured but not killed; and 4) Whether the Bullard holding
extends to situations in which a child beyond the age of majority is wrongfully
killed?
The Bullard court failed to mention whether the formula for recovery may
include the value of lost society and companionship after the child reaches
the age of majority. Bullard limits the set-off of child rearing expenses, such
as education, maintenance, and support, to those incurred before the child
reaches majority.166' Once the child reaches the age of majority, parent and
child no longer owe each other obligations of support and service.167 The
court, however, did not set a time limit on calculations for compensating
loss of society. The loss of a child's economic contributions and household
services has always included the reasonable expectation of benefits from the
child's entire life and should not be limited to the child's minority.'16
Consequently, because Bullard essentially replaces the loss of services formula
with a loss of society formula, the latter formula should similarly permit
the parent to recover for loss of society the child would have contributed
beyond the age of majority. Nothing in the Illinois Wrongful Death Act,
however, distinguishes between these damages.
The best solution to this problem would be to measure future lost society
on the basis of the parent's or child's projected life expectancy, whichever
is shorter.'" The court should recognize that the child could have provided
society and companionship as well as economic assistance to the surviving
parents. 7 1 The parent-child relationship does not terminate at the arbitrary
166. See also Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. 2d 201, 205-10, 432 P.2d 541, 544-
47 (1967).
167. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 96; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 125 at 935.
168. See Lichtenstein v. Fish Furniture Co., 272 I1. 191, 198-99, II1 N.E. 729, 732 (1916)
(upholding jury instruction which allowed computation of lost services beyond age 18); City of
Chicago v. Keefe, 114 II. 222, 229, 2 N.E. 267, 270 (1885) (holding that a jury instruction
restricting recovery for lost earnings to age 21 was properly refused); Mortenson v. Sullivan, 3
Ill. App. 3d 332, 336, 278 N.E.2d 6, 10 (2d Dist. 1972) (the consensus of Illinois courts regard
children to be responsible for the parents' pecuniary needs in old age).
169. Usually, a parent's life expectancy would be shorter than that of a child's. However,
evidence of a pre-existing terminal disease in the child would require lost society to be based
on the child's life expectancy. See Parson v. Easton, 184 Cal. 764, 195 P. 419 (1921); Note,
Wrongful Death of Children-The Real Injury, 5 W. ST. U.L. REV. 253, 256 (1978).
170. See, e.g., Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965) (judge should consider
future companionship of the deceased 21-year-old girl); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 11, 424
A.2d 210, 215 (1980) (children provide valuable companionship and society as parents get older
and face deteriorating health).
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point of the child's majority. 7 ' Rather, the relationship between the parent
and child continues beyond majority for reasons of gratitude or obligation.
Many children remain devoted companions to their aged and often infirm
parents. Moreover, parents should receiye the value of lost society and
companionship beyond the age of majority because parents' life expectancies
are increasing and children contribute valuable companionship in their par-
ents' declining years. 72 Juries can infer that when the child and parents
enjoyed a close relationship, the child would have contributed society and
companionship after reaching majority. The prospective aid, comfort, soci-
ety, and companionship that a child would have given, regardless of age,
should be recognized as a compensable loss.' 73 Therefore, juries should be
instructed to compensate parents for loss of their child's society and com-
panionship beyond the age of majority.'7 4
One commentator has noted that juries must speculate when they calculate
the value of lost society for the child's post-majority years. 75 Questions of
whether the child would have married and had dependents, and how close
the relationship between the parent and child would have remained had the
child lived, arise in such determinations. 76 It is no more difficult, however,
for juries to measure anticipated loss of society, than to determine other
abstract or intangible concepts with which juries are required to deal. 7
Illinois juries must often place a value on pain and suffering, loss of spousal
consortium, emotional distress, and future loss of a minor's services, and
have done so successfully. 7 It would not be unreasonable for juries to
estimate the future lost society of the child.
171. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 7-8, 424 A.2d 210, 213 (1980).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 11-14, 424 A.2d at 215-17. See also Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 305
A.2d 166 (1973) (recovery under wrongful death statute not limited to period of minority).
174. See Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, I11 (Utah 1982) ("damages for the wrongful death
of a child is in reality recompense for a future loss-the loss of future sharing of love,
companionship and society"); see also Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of
Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 198-200 (1971) (recovery for child's post-majority con-
tributions is reasonable basis for recovery and is accepted by a majority of courts).
175. See Decof, supra note 174, at 199 (greatest problem with post-majority calculations is
proving that child would have conferred the benefits).
176. Id.
177. Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 278, 207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1973).
178. See D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1973); Hoekstra v. Helgaland,
78 S.D. 82, 107, 98 N.W.2d 669, 682 (1959); Johnson, supra note 9, at 44.
Moreover, the "speculation" argument is inadequate because future loss of society and
companionship can be valued easily in terms of a "pecuniary" injury to the parent. For
example, loss of companionship can be given a monetary value based on substantially equivalent
services that a nurse or companion would provide. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. I, 424 A.2d 210
(1980). Similarly, the loss of prospective advice, guidance, and counsel can be evaluated by
considering the pecuniary value of equivalent services that a business advisor, a therapist, or a
counselor would provide. Id. In Illinois, where the law presumes that a substantial loss results
from the child's death alone, evidence that the parents would have actually purchased such
professional services because of the child's death is not necessary. Evidence that the deceased
child would have rendered such pecuniary benefits to the parents would be sufficient. Id. See
also Bridge v. Borack, 524 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that the advice
and counsel that deceased 21-year-old would have given his parents as to business decisions,
family financial decisions, and personal dilemmas have monetary value).
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The supreme court did not discuss the potential extension of Bullard to
other family relationships. The Bullard decision recognized that the parents'
interest in compensation for loss of the deceased child's society outweighs
the negligent defendant's interest in being free from liability for such a loss.
The defendant's liability, however, must have some reasonable limitation.
Requiring a wrongdoer to pay for the lost society of every person who had
some relationship with the decedent would place an unreasonable burden on
human activity and would create liability disproportionate to the defendant's
culpability. 7 ' Thus, public policy dictates that liability for loss of consortium
be limited at some point.
One logical point of demarcation could be set at the parent-child and
husband-wife relationships, where the losses are immediate, real, and severe.
Recovery for lost society suffered by the defendant's siblings is an apparently
unreasonable extension of the defendant's liability. Arguably the impact of
a brother's or sister's death on the surviving sibling may be as severe as the
impact of a child's death on the parent. In some circumstances, the siblings
might have spent more time with the decedent than the parents.'s,' Never-
theless, the presumption of pecuniary injury from the loss of society afforded
to parents of the decedent should not be extended to siblings; Illinois does
not consider collateral kin to suffer more than nominal damages from the
child's death unless they prove otherwise."' Sibling recovery, therefore,
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
In Prendergast v. Cox an Illinois appellate court did not allow lost society
to siblings in the wrongful death of an adult. 2 The court stated that lineal
kin, unlike collateral kin, are presumed to suffer pecuniary loss because of
the "special" relationship that exists only between lineal kin.' Collateral
kin must therefore prove actual loss. 8 4 Illinois has traditionally distinguished
179. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 54, at 366; see Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,
619, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1969) ("Every injury has ramifying conse-
quences, like the rippling of the waters, without end .... [The problem] is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.").
180. Note, Children: Chattels to Chuns-Shockley v. Prier, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 169, 177
(1976) (advocating that lost society recovery should be extended to siblings because siblings are
often in each other's company more than in the company of their parents); see Crystal v.
Hubbard, 414 Mich. 197, 324 N.W.2d 869 (1982) (siblings may recover lost society under the
Michigan wrongful death statute); Note, Crystal v. Hubbard: Recovery for Loss of Society and
Companionship by Potential Heirs Under Michigan's Wrongful Death Act, I DET. C.L. REV.
153 (1984). See also City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 III. 222, 229, 2 N.E. 267, 270 (1885) (brothers
and sisters might reasonably expect to derive pecuniary benefits from their siblings); Carr, supra
note 48, at 583 (nothing in the wording of the Illinois statute which would bar sibling recovery).
181. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp.
455 (N.D. II1. 1982); Mugairo v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 239 Ill. App. 544, 550 (2d Dist.
1926).
182. 128 III. App. 3d 84, 470 N.E.2d 34 (Ist Dist. 1984).
183. Id. at 90, 470 N.E.2d at 37. The court, however, does not define "special" relationship.
184. See Mugaviro v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 239 Il1. App. 544 (2d Dist. 1926) (denying




between lineal and collateral kin when granting recovery. 85 The Prendergast
court also observed that in the Bullard case, only parents (lineal kin) were
permitted to claim the lost society of a minor. 86 The Prendergast court
would not expand Bullard to permit sibling recovery for lost society.'87
It is unclear whether the Prendergast court denied sibling recovery because
it felt that only parents should recover for lost society or because the
decedent's siblings in this particular case did not prove actual loss of society.
At trial, the decedent's brothers and sisters presented evidence that the
decedent had given them gifts and done various home maintenance and
repair work for them. 88 All of the siblings were also friendly with the
decedent. 8 9 The court's denial of recovery might have been based on the
lack of proof presented at trial since lost society suffered by collateral kin
is not presumed. The court might also have cautiously chosen, as a matter
of law, not to expand defendant liability to adult siblings who reside outside
the decedent's home. Regardless of the basis of the Prendergast decision,
the legislature should set the limits of recovery for lost society since it is
best equipped to make such a policy decision regarding the Wrongful Death
Act.
The most equitable extension of Bullard would be to allow recovery to
persons acting in loco parentis'90 with the decedent. Whether a person served
as a "parent" to the child would be a question for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis. If, for example, the plaintiff is a foster parent 9' or
a grandparent who raised the child prior to the child's death, there is no
basis for denying an action for lost society.' 2 The loss of the child's society
and companionship will often be as great as in the natural parent-child
relationship. 191
Another issue that remains after Bullard is whether the court's rationale
can be extended to cases in which a child is negligently injured. In such
185. Hall v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); Prendergast v. Cox, 128 Ill. App.
3d 84, 470 N.E.2d 34 (1st Dist. 1984); see Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708
(1949); Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 388 N.E.2d 906 (5th Dist. 1979); see also supra
notes 61-63.
186. 128 Ill. App. 3d at 89, 470 N.E.2d at 37.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 86, 470 N.E.2d at 35.
189. Id.
190. In loco parentis is defined as "in the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708
(5th ed. 1979).
191. Hollis v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. App. 407, 303 S.W.2d 751 (1957) (allowing foster parents
to act in loco parentis).
192. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 94 (if courts deny recovery to persons in loco parentis,
but allow natural parents to recover, courts might be violating state and federal equal protection
guarantees); see also Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 850 (1947) (parent, as well as person in loco parentis entitled to child's earnings); Ball
v. Bruce, 21 Il1. 161 (1859) (sister-in-law could recover loss of services of a minor girl seduced
by defendant).
193. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of An Injured
Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 622 (1976).
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cases, the child's society is diminished but not lost. After Bullard, many of
the traditional arguments against recovery in such cases are obsolete. For
example, Bullard rejected the argument that a spouse's claim for loss of
consortium differs from the parents' claim for loss of a child's consortium
due to the sexual element of the marriage relationship. The Bullard court
noted that loss of consortium broadly includes not only sexual relations, but
also aid, society, love, and companionship, which are equally present in the
husband-wife and parent-child relationships. Moreover, Bullard rejected the
argument that loss of society is an intangible injury incapable of pecuniary
valuation.
Courts in other jurisdictions have allowed recovery to parents when their
child is negligently injured only when the injury is severe. 94 For example,
the Wisconsin case of Shockley v. Prier 95 involved a child who was negli-
gently administered an excessive amount of oxygen during delivery, which
resulted in disfigurement and total blindness. In allowing damages for lost
society and companionship to the parents of the injured child, the Shockley
court stated that the injury would likely have a "shattering effect" on the
child's relationship with his parents. 96 The Shockley court reasoned that
since the Wisconsin Wrongful Death Act recognized consortium as a com-
pensable injury, it should also recognize loss of consortium when a child is
severely injured.' 9' In order to prevent double recovery, however, the court
concluded that parents have a right to maintain an action for the loss of
society of a negligently injured child only if the parents' cause of action was
joined with the child's cause of action for his own injuries. g9
A recent Illinois Appellate Court decision, employing an analysis similar
to that of the Shockley court, allowed recovery for the loss of an injured
minor's society and companionship in accordance with the Bullard rationale.
In Dymek v. Nyquist,"99 a father brought an action against his former wife
and a psychiatrist who was treating the plaintiff's nine-year-old son. The
194. Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (severe facial
disfigurement); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975)
(child had blindness, brain damage, quadriplegia, and petit and grand mal seizures; although
not permitting recovery in this particular case, court expressly recognized right to recover for
lost society of injured child); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975)
(blindness and disfigurement).
195. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
196. Id. at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499. The plaintiff's counsel could raise the argument that it
is a violation of the equal protection clause to allow recovery to the parents of a deceased
child, but not to parents of an injured child. One commentator suggested that a court should
apply an intermediate standard of review. Love, supra note 193, at 607-13. An intermediate
analysis would require the court to consider whether the injury-death classification rests "upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
Id. at 612. After careful analysis, the commentator concluded that it would be unlikely that
the court would find justification for the "death-injury" classification "despite its purported
objective of assuring that only genuine claims are compensated." Id. at 612-13.
197. 66 Wis. 2d at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
198. Id.
199. 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d. 659 (lst Dist. 1984).
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plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to "gain physical and mental
custody and control of plaintiff's son"'1° so as to "injure and destroy the
society and companionship of the child ' ' 2°1 with respect to his father. Since
the Bullard court concluded that "parents are entitled to a presumption of
pecuniary injury in the loss of a child's society" under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act, 2 2 the Dymek court reasoned that the presumption should also
apply to cases involving the non-fatal injury of a minor child. 2113 The Dymek
court concluded that "[it] should . . . recognize a cause of action for parental
loss of a minor (injured) child's society and companionship. '204
Although the Dymek case did not involve a seriously injured child, as in
Shockley,20 5 the underlying reason for allowing recovery in both cases was
that it would be anomalous to cut off recovery merely because the child
survived a non-fatal injury. The Illinois Supreme Court had adopted a similar
rationale in the past in cases that involved the loss of consortium of a
spouse. 206 Regardless of the rationale, after Dymek, Illinois courts can no
longer rely on the absence of precedent as a basis for denying recovery for
the loss of society of an injured child.
The last question left unanswered by Bullard is whether the presumption
of loss of society can be applied to a decedent who has reached the age of
majority. Because Scott Bullard was seventeen years old when he died, the
court found it unnecessary to consider whether its holding should extend to
adult children. 20 7 The concurring opinion, however, believed that the majority
should have addressed the issue and that "the logic embodied in the majority
opinion would dictate a similar result if this case involved a twenty-seven-
year-old rather than a seventeen-year-old. 2 °0
200. Id. at 861, 469 N.E.2d at 661.
201. Id. at 867, 469 N.E.2d at 666.
202. Id.
203. Id. The Dymek court reasoned that even though Bullard concerned a wrongful death
action, the Bullard rationale could be applied in Dymek where the defendant's wrongful conduct
had the non-fatal consequence of "brainwashing" the child. Id.
204. Id. at 868, 469 N.E.2d at 666. See also Stephens v. Weigel, 336 Il1. App. 36, 82 N.E.2d
697 (2d Dist. 1948). In Stephens, the court held that the husband-father was properly entitled
to assert a claim for the loss of services and society of his wife and daughter. The Stephens
court, however, did not discuss the issue of lost society of an injured child nor did it include
citation of authority. Nevertheless, other jurisdictions and legal commentators have repeatedly
cited Stephens for the proposition that Illinois accepts the theory of compensating the parent
for loss of society of a negligently injured child. See Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461,
464 n.1, 563 P.2d 871, 873 n.1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 n.1 (1977); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.
2d 394, 402-03, 225 N.W.2d 495, 500 (1975); Feldman, supra note 29, at 112 n.143; Love,
supra note 193, at 591 n.1; Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship
Resulting from the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
909, 916; Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 553, 568 (1976). Cf. Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 I1. App.
3d 400, 408, 440 N.E.2d 942, 947 (1st Dist. 1982) (Stephens court did not address issue of
parent's action for lost society of a deceased child).
205. Supra notes 195-198.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 86-104.
207. 102 Il1. 2d at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
208. Id. at 521, 468 N.E.2d at 1241 (Clark, J., concurring).
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Prior to Bullard, the law presumed that, whether the decedent was a minor
or an adult,119 the lineal kin incurred substantial loss of earnings and services.
Just as the Bullard decision overruled the use of lost earnings as the sole
measure of damages in child death cases, Bullard's rationale should be
extended to the adult child death case. Clearly, since many adult children
today still live at home or are supported by parents while at college, the
friendship, companionship, and society between parent and child remain a
continuing and reciprocal part of the relationship. Unfortunately, with re-
spect to awarding damages in wrongful death actions, the Bullard court did
not resolve the ambiguity between two classes of offspring: minor children
and adult children. 210
Since Bullard, two Illinois appellate courts have considered actions for
loss of consortium for the death of an adult child and reached contrary
results. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, in Prendergast v.
Cox,2 'I recognized a presumption of lost society for the wrongful death of
an adult child. In Prendergast, a mother claimed loss of society following
the death of her thirty-eight-year-old unmarried son, with whom she had
been living at the time of death and on whom she depended for "advice,
companionship, and assistance."12 2 Based on the concurring opinion in
Bullard, the Prendergast court reasoned that the presumption of lost society
could be extended to the parents of deceased adult children. 2 3 The court
concluded that the age of the child at the time of death should not determine




The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District, however, held that
the presumption of loss of society cannot be extended to adult children in
wrongful death cases. In Ballweg v. City of Springfield,215 the court analyzed
Bullard's newly created presumption and also examined the basis for the
supreme court's refusal to consider extending the presumption to compensate
the parents of deceased adult children. The Ballweg court noted that the
Bullard decision defined presumption as "an inference which common sense
draws from the known course of events." '2 6 The court in Ballweg stated that
the relationship between parents and their adult children differs from rela-
209. The presumption of pecuniary loss was originally created for minor child-death cases
where the child's habits of industry and potential work were difficult to prove. Flynn v. Vancil,
41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968); City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (1857). The
presumption of lost services was later applied to adult-child death cases. Davis v. Hazen, 582
F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Ill. 1983) (presumption applies even when decedent was an adult); Ferraro
v. Augustine, 45 I1. App. 2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16 (1964) (allowing parental recovery for lost
services of a 35-year-old son residing in his parents home at time of death).
210. The following cases allowed lost consortium recovery for the death of an adult-child:
Halvorsen v. Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1974); Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134
N.W.2d 611 (1965); McCorkell v. City of Northfield, 272 Minn. 24, 136 N.W.2d 840 (1965).
211. 128 I1. App. 3d 84, 470 N.E.2d 34 (Ist Dist. 1984).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 86-89, 470 N.E.2d at 36-37.
214. Id.
215. 130 Ill. App. 3d 24, 473 N.E.2d 342 (4th Dist. 1984).
216. Id. at 29, 473 N.E.2d at 346.
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tions among adults. Accordingly, the court held that "it is reasonable to
require a [parent] to prove lost society rather than to presume such a loss
in all cases." 2 7
Both Prendergast and Ballweg recognize the parent's right to recover for
the loss of society of an adult child. The courts differ, however, as to
whether recovery for lost society should be based on actual proof or should
be presumed in all cases. The Illinois Supreme Court must resolve this
conflict in a clear and cQmprehensive opinion.
IMPACT
The positive impact of Bullard substantially outweighs the problems created
by its ambiguities. Illinois courts will no longer need to justify damage
awards to bereaved parents for the wrongful death of a child on the legal
fiction of pecuniary loss of earnings and services.1 8 Courts and juries can
now base damage awards on the "real ' 2 9 loss suffered when a child is
negligently killed-the loss of the child's society and companionship. More-
over, the decision will reduce the number of unjust damage awards imposed
by juries under the restrictive pecuniary loss standard.220 For example, in
1983, an Illinois appellate court affirmed a mere $7000 judgment to a father
whose sixteen-year-old daughter had been negligently killed. 22' With remedies
for lost society available to compensate parents, juries need no longer return
such nominal verdicts.
Decisions expanding defendant's liability for personal injury often raise
concerns over increases in insurance costs to the public. 222 The public will
217. Id.
218. See Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 63 111. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976) ($180,000
verdicts affirmed for wrongful death of two college students who were not then contributing
to their parents).
219. See Decof, supra note 174, at 206. The "real" losses a parent suffers when deprived
of a child's society include:
the joy of watching a child taking his first steps or utter his first words; the thrill
in seeing a son score a touchdown or a daughter perform ballet; the pride in
watching a child graduate from high school, college, or medical school; and the
comfort from a Sunday visit and the holidays, filled with the cheer that children
and grandchildren bring.
Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 29 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
220. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 1, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980); see, e.g., Flynn v. Vancil, 41
I1l. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968) (no damages found for wrongful death of a child with
congenital disease).
221. See Trotter v. Moore, 113 II1. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (2d Dist. 1983). Recently,
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Trotter case for further proceedings
consistent with Bullard. Trotter v. Moore, 468 N.E.2d 1236 (I11. 1984). See also Flynn v. Vancil,
41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968) (upholding a jury's verdict of no damages where a two-
week-old child was wrongfully killed but evidence established that the child had a congenital
illness). Cf. Long v. Bennett, 55 111. App. 3d 50, 370 N.E.2d 627 (4th Dist. 1977) (court reversed
verdict of $8000 for wrongful death of child).
222. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 893 (1980); Koskela v. Martin, 91 111. App. 3d
568, 572, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (1980); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344
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likely bear the burden of paying for lost consortium awards through increased
premiums since insurance policies will satisfy most such awards under the
Wrongful Death Act. As a result, potential defendants may choose to go
without insurance rather than pay the increased costs. 23 Increases in insur-
ance premiums and the number of uninsured tortfeasors, however, does not
justify denying recovery to the parents, who are least able to prevent the
loss. Furthermore, if this insurance argument were valid, the proper solution
would be to eliminate the cause of action for loss of consortium entirely,
rather than indiscriminately deny recovery to parents.2 24
To date, there is neither supporting evidence nor precise predictions as to
the effect the Bullard decision will have on insurance premiums. 2 1 If com-
pensation for loss of society of children proves to be too great a strain on
insurance costs, the legislature can place a statutory ceiling on the amount
recoverable for loss of society and companionship.2 26 Since compensation
for loss of society has been deemed appropriate in cases involving the loss
of a child, maximum limits on damage recovery is preferable to no redress
at all. 22 Also, if juries return unreasonably excessive verdicts, courts are
empowered to reduce the award to an amount reasonably commensurate
with proven losses. 211
N.W.2d 513 (1984); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 82, at 591.
The issue of an increase in premiums was specifically raised in the Michigan Supreme Court
decision of Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965). The Currie court upheld
a damage award in the amount of $32,788.32 for lost society and companionship of a wrongfully
killed 21-year-old girl. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that:
What today's usurpation of legislative power, by the judiciary, will do to contem-
poraneously rising liability insurance rates is visible for all to see. Loss of a
decedent's companionship knows no "pecuniary" base and no evidentiary limit.
Foreseeable are extravagant awards to those who, by the wrongful death of some
relative, lose nothing beyond piously shed tears and so are unjustly enriched at
expense of the premium-paying public.
Id. at 486, 134 N.W.2d at 632.
223. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 306 (1977).
224. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 428, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960) (concept of
consortium is not "ready for the discard pile").
225. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 82, at 591.
226. Feldman, supra note 29, at 116; see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 2-804 (1984-
85) ($50,000 limit).
227. Love, supra note 193, at 605.
228. Comment, Torts-Parent's Recovery for Loss of Society and Companionship of Child,
80 W. VA. L. REV. 340, 349 (1977-78). Apparently, the Bullard court was concerned with the
possibility that excessive verdicts would result from its decision to allow parental lost consortium
recovery. To mitigate the possibility of juries overcompensating parents for their loss, the court
included a child rearing expense set-off in its formula for recovery. The court also reiterated
that mental anguish, a purely emotional loss, was not a compensable pecuniary injury under
the wrongful death statute. Bullard, 102 II. 2d at 515-19, 468 N.E.2d at 1233-35.
Illinois courts do not recognize compensable loss for mental anguish caused by the wrongful
death of a child. Zostautos v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 !11. 2d 326, 337, 178 N.E.2d
303, 311 (1961). This is the majority view. See, e.g., Jones v. Hildebrandt, 191 Colo. I, 550
P.2d 339 (1976); Hahn v. Moore, 127 Ind. App. 149, 133 N.E.2d 900 (1956); Wycko v.
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Prior to Bullard, no child rearing set-off had been employed in an Illinois
wrongful death case.2 9 The effect of such a set-off, as Justice Clark pre-
dicted, will be to substantially reduce the amount of the parents' lost society
award due to the Bullard court's belief that the wrongdoer is sparing the
parents the financial burden of raising the child.230 Because Scott Bullard
was seventeen years old at the time of his death, a deduction for college
tuition and living expenses would have substantially reduced the loss of
society award in the Bullard case. Consequently, the set-off will reduce the
likelihood of excessive verdicts. However, the set-off will also make it
difficult for parents to recover substantial pecuniary damages, particularly
when the deceased is an infant.2 1' The ultimate unfairness of the set-off is
that the wrongdoer would profit as a result of the parents' support obliga-
tions. The best solution, perhaps, would be for the legislature to set a
reasonable maximum limitation on lost society recovery and completely
eliminate the set-off for child-rearing expenses.
It is arguable that the Illinois Supreme Court lacked the authority to
extend lost society recovery to the parent of a deceased child. The defendants
in Bullard argued that the court should have awaited an indication from the
General Assembly on whether loss of society should be recoverable following
the death of a child. 232 Although the legislature has twice attempted to amend
the Illinois Wrongful Death Act to allow damages for lost society, neither
bill was passed. 233 Faced with a similar factual and legislative background,
the Texas Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Schindler2 4 abandoned the pecuniary
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210
(1980). A minority of jurisdictions, however, permit recovery for mental anguish. See, e.g.,
Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983); Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C.
127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Wolfe v.
Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1984); MD. [CTS. & JUD. PROC.] ANN. CODE § 3-904(d) (1984); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (1985). One commentator notes four reasons for the majority
view: 1) the rule is well-settled by statute or case law; 2) spurious, inequitable claims and
runaway jury awards would be likely; 3) damages would be speculative and difficult to measure;
and 4) in states measuring damages by loss to decedent's estate, mental anguish is not viewed
as part of the estate. 4 DAMAGES IN TORT, supra note 14, § 24.2211].
229. See supra note 51.
230. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 520-21, 468 N.E.2d at 1236 (Clark J., concurring). Alternatively,
in order to fully compensate parents, juries will resort, once again, to a fiction by setting
unusually high values for loss of society to offset the required child rearing deductions. See
supra note 81 (discussing the fiction of pecuniary injuries). Otherwise, the child rearing deduction
will result in the parents of a deceased 17-year-old receiving more than the parents of a deceased
17-month-old.
231. See, e.g., Tuhy, What Price Children? MONEY, MARCH 1983, at 77 ($81,000 to $117,000
to raise child to adulthood); Computing the Cost of Kids, Bus. WK., August 30, 1982, at 80
($323,000 to $344,000 for "reasonably successful business family"; $221,000-$247,000 for
"average family"); 25 ATLA L. REP. 242-43 (Aug. 1982) ($255,000 to raise a child to
adulthood).
232. 102 111. 2d at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
233. 1982 I11. Legis. Ref. Bureau, Legis. Synopsis & Digest, H.B. 445, p. 697 (West); 1981
Ill. Legis. Ref. Bureau, Legis. Synopsis & Digest, H.B. 445, p. 974 (West).
234. 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983).
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loss limitation in favor of recognizing lost society and mental anguish, even
though the Texas legislature had failed to pass bills allowing such recovery.
The Sanchez court concluded that it was not bound by legislative inaction
in an area of tort law that had primarily developed through the judicial
process.2"
Similarly, in Illinois, the legislature's prior inaction should not prohibit
judicial review of the pecuniary loss limitation.23 6 In 1982, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held in Elliott v. Willis that lost consortium is a recoverable
pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act.2" Subsequent legislative
sessions failed to amend the statute to include or exclude lost consortium
recovery. The legislature's failure to act demonstrates their acquiesence to
the Elliott court's broad interpretation of the statute. When a statute has
been judicially construed and no subsequent amendment is evoked, it will
be presumed that the legislature has accepted the court's construction of the
legislative intent. 2"
By allowing recovery for the loss of society of a deceased child, the Illinois
Supreme Court has chosen not to compound the error caused by the legis-
lature's failure to act.239 The Bullard decision does not create a new cause
of action, and does not represent a usurpation of the amending powers of
the legislature. 40 The decision represents a proper judicial reappraisal of
common law concepts in light of present day realities.2 1' Courts created the
rule that denied recovery for lost society and companionship. Courts can
235. Id.; see also Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, .10 HASTINGS L.J. 237,
245-46 (1959) (judicial decision is best way to develop tort law; it is difficult to reduce refinements
of tort law into statutory form).
236. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983).
237. 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
238. People v. Hairstron, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840 (1970); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d
406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); see also Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's
Love, Care, and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV.
722, 728 (1976) (child's consortium action does not require detailed guidelines or creative
administrative mechanisms provided by the legislature).
239. As Justice Bristow stated before granting a wife the right to maintain an action for loss
of consortium of her injured husband:
We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our essential function of re-
evaluating common-law concepts in the light of present day realities. Nor do we
find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting the words and
analyses of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the
past. On the contrary ..."we do indeed have a 'charge to keep' but that charge
is not to 'perpetuate error,' or to allow our reasoning or conscience to decay, or
to turn deaf ears to new light and new life."
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 429, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960) (citation omitted) (quoting
Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24, 32 (1953)).
240. Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., II Ill. App. 3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1973)
(Wrongful Death Act not subject to amendment by judicial fiat), rev'd on other grounds, 63
111. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
241. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 II1. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); see also Peck, The Role
of the Courts and Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963)
(discussing reform of tort law and concluding that courts are capable of appraising rationale
of existing tort rules).
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also change the rule when it no longer meets society's needs. 42 Moreover,
the Bullard decision neither upsets nor abolishes the legislatively created
pecuniary loss rule. The decision simply expands the recovery allowed under
that rule.243 The court's decision to allow lost society recovery to a parent
was well within the province of the judiciary. 244
CONCLUSION
The Bullard decision is an overdue solution to the inequitable pecuniary
loss standard, which denied parental recovery for loss of a child's society
and companionship. The limited remedy was tolerated for over a century.
In an attempt to more accurately reflect the parental loss, the Illinois Supreme
Court realistically expanded the damages recoverable under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act to include lost society and companionship. The Bullard
decision recognizes that the child is an integral part of the family unit and
that the death of a child does not merely result in an economic loss to the
family. Instead, a child's death destroys the parent-child relationship and
creates a loss of the myriad pleasures that can be derived from that rela-
tionship.
The extent of Bullard's impact in future cases remains unclear. In one
appellate court decision subsequent to Bullard, the court extended the Bullard
presumption of pecuniary loss of society to a child who was injured rather
than killed.245 Yet, in another case, the court concluded that Bullard could
not be expanded to include recovery to siblings.246 Two appellate districts
also differ on the impact of Bullard's holding in cases involving the wrongful
death of an adult child.
Bullard unambiguously entitles Illinois parents to recover for the lost
society and companionship of their minor children in a wrongful death
action. The court abandoned the outmoded pecuniary loss limitation set over
one hundred years ago. The decision aligns Illinois law with the current
trend in most jurisdictions. Next, the legislature must amend the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act to expressly include lost consortium recovery for the
242. See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984); Shockley v.
Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 397, 225 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1975).
243. See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 15, 424 A.2d 210, 217 (1980).
244. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (Dooley J.,
concurring). Justice Dooley stated that all "courts create law. If it were otherwise the common
law would be as out of touch with life as is a corpse. Courts must take an active part in the
development of the common law, although this may mean creativeness," Id. at 361, 367 N.E.2d
at 1257; see also Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 416, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (since plaintiff's
loss of consortium action was -judge-invented," it can be judicially altered to fit new cases);
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (stating that it is courts' duty to broaden
the Wrongful Death Act to include social conditions).
245. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
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spouse and next of kin.2 47 Such clarification would serve to benefit the courts
handling future wrongful death cases.
Adrienne Lehrbaum- Weiss
247. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1966). The Wycko court
responded to the argument that the legislature's inaction connotes approval of the strict
pecuniary loss interpretation. The court stated that "[a] legislature legislates by legislating, not
by doing nothing, not by keeping silent." 361 Mich. at 338, 105 N.W.2d at 121-22.
